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Abstract 
 
 
 
sing methods of multi-state population projection, the population of China up to 
2045 was studied by simultaneous interacting states of educational categories 
and urban/rural residence in three alternative future paths. The results anticipate that 
in 2045, more than 60% of the population will have secondary education, while this 
was the case for only 8% of the population in1964. This study not only produces 
educational projections, it also provides regular population projections by age, sex, 
and urban/rural place of residence. In the coming decades, China will reach its peak in 
total population, working population, and aging population in different times under 
low, medium and high scenarios. According to results of this study, an important 
question will face Chinese policy makers in the context of sustainable socioeconomic 
and environmental development: How should the anticipated socioeconomic 
developments in the coming decades be figured into the demographic trade-off 
between rapid fertility decline in the near term and rapid population aging in the long 
term? 
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Section 1  Introduction 
 
 
 
hile demographic processes and structures rest on a biological base, changes in 
fertility, mortality and migration are to a large degree socially determined. 
Economics, social processes and environmental issues have far-reaching demographic 
consequences, affecting population size, age structure, and family formation. Education 
is of overwhelming social, economic, and cultural importance. During the process of 
demographic transition, the strong negative correlation between higher education and 
lower fertility is especially pronounced. 
 
This report studies population trends and the role of present and future educational 
trends in shaping the future population of China in the context of IIASA’s multi-state 
demographic projection model. The development of China’s population in association 
with social, economic, and environmental changes has drawn much attention from 
international scholars and policy makers. In the advent of economic reform, including 
educational and social welfare reform, many new trends have arisen and consequently, 
the effects of the economic reform have strongly influenced demographic components 
such as fertility, mortality and rural-to-urban migration. 
 
A number of projections for China’s future population have been produced by 
demographers at the UN and other international institutions, as well as in China. The 
projection presented here is different from other forecasts. One very important feature 
of this study is that it explicitly includes educational status of the population in its 
projection. The multi-state population projection method not only considers fertility, 
mortality, and migration as the driving forces of demographic change, but also assumes 
education by age, sex, and region as a dimension in population projection. To our 
knowledge this is the first time that the educational composition by age, sex, and region 
has systematically been used for the demographic method of cohort-component 
projection in China. 
 
Another feature of this study is that it independently projects the urban and rural 
population (the national population projection of China consists of aggregated results of 
urban and rural projections). Demographers have devoted little attention to fertility 
trends and variations in China, e.g. its localities. The urban-rural projections produced 
by other institutions are based only on assumed future proportions of urban population, 
which are then applied to the projected national population by age and sex. In China, 
place of residence, particularly urban/rural divided, is an important issue for many 
social and economic considerations, and it strongly correlates with demographic 
changes (Lutz et al. 1999). Under the central planned economy, Chinese cities were 
closed off to farmers by the “invisible walls” of the household registration system (Chan 
1997). Levels of socioeconomic development have differed largely between rural and 
urban regions. The result of these “invisible walls” is that China has become a highly 
segmented society, divided by the geographical division of urban and rural sectors. So 
far, the urban household registration system, which determines where one can live and 
work, has prevented a tidal wave of rural migrants, who cannot be fully absorbed in the 
W 
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urban areas. Especially socioeconomic differences between rural and urban regions 
have increased during the economic reform.!
 
It is appropriate for China’s population projection to use net migration as a parameter in 
the multi-state model. Since the 1980s, a large rural-to-urban migratory movement has 
challenged the powerful household registration system, and brought on agricultural and 
urban industrial economic reforms. Rural-to-urban migration in China has become a hot 
issue for policy makers and scientists. It not only changes the economic structure and 
social stability, it also strongly correlates with demographic distribution, age structure 
and demographic transition. It is not an easy task to collect the date of migration 
because there is no exact definition of migration, and almost every source has different 
information and estimates. We have calculated and adjusted the information and date of 
migration by age, sex, and education in order to meet the requirements of the multi-state 
model for population projection. From this point of view, our study can be considered as 
a pioneer study. 
 
Using recently available data, we attempt to study the following questions: 
 
1) To what extent do educational levels have an impact on future population growth? 
2) Do educational differentials make a difference in projected population growth? 
3) How is the age structure influenced by educational and regional differences? 
4) To what extent do educational differentials affect the distribution of population in the 
future? 
5) What is the likely educational composition of the population in the future? 
 
In addition to this introduction, this report consists of four sections. Section 2 describes 
the salient demographic features affected by rural and urban regions, as well as by 
educational differentials in contemporary China. The analysis focuses on the 
development of education, fertility, rural-to-urban migration, aging, and sex ratio. 
Section 3 briefly describes the data and sources used, and explains the base-line input 
used, such as modified fertility, estimated migration by education and age, and 
estimates of the elderly population by educational categories. Nine sets of scenario 
assumptions for the future course of fertility, mortality, migration and education by 
rural/urban regions over the next 50 years are presented. Section 4 analyses the 
projection results and shows the population size, age structure, educational composition, 
rural and urban distribution of the population at both the national and rural/urban levels. 
Section 5 concludes the discussion. The policy implications lay emphasis on the 
obtained results of the population projection concerning shifts in Chinese family policy, 
integrated policy approach, and migration policy, which may be used by planners and 
policy makers for sustainable development planning in China. 
!3 
Section 2  Salient Demographic Features in 
      Contemporary China 
 
 
 
hina is the most advanced developing country in the population transition process, 
where fertility rates declined from 4.2 births per woman in 1974 to below 
replacement level, 1.85, in 1995. The factors fostering the fertility transition in China 
have been attributed to the government’s population policies and family planning 
programs. On the other hand, a broad spectrum of causes is related to socioeconomic 
development beyond the government’s population policies and family planning 
programs. The fertility transition has been recently influenced by the rapid 
socioeconomic changes resulting from the new economic reform. In urban regions, the 
economic reform may have increased the potential benefits of having fewer children in 
families. In rural areas, however, the substitution of the household responsibility system 
of production for the commune system has increased productivity and household 
income, but has weakened the government’s ability to regulate fertility. 
 
It is interesting to ask why fertility patterns and trends differ in urban and rural China in 
spite of a uniform intensification of population policies throughout the nation. These 
differences have resulted from differences in socioeconomic conditions. It seems likely 
that most of the factors tend to facilitate the government’s effort to make information, 
supplies, and services accessible to the urban population (Cheng and Maxim 1992). 
Among the socioeconomic factors, education is an actual or potential determinant of 
fertility reduction. Studies have shown that education affects several aspects of fertility 
in China. First, educational development has had a substantial effect on the age at which 
women marry because they stay in school longer and because education widens their 
employment opportunities in the labor market. Second, higher educational levels have 
substantially raised the investment costs of children, especially for parents who wish to 
ensure good career prospects for their children. Finally, education promotes a rational 
view of family formation and the acceptance of contraception for either spacing or 
limiting the number of children. 
 
In the following, we briefly view educational changes in China over the past decades, 
and address fertility, migration, aging, and sex ratio by comparing rural and urban 
regions. 
 
!
2.1 Development of Education 
 
Education begins with kindergarten (ages 3-6) and continues with primary (ages 6-12) 
and secondary (ages 12-18), which includes junior and senior secondary schools, 
specialized secondary schools, vocational secondary schools, and technical training 
schools. Higher education, which includes universities and colleges as well as college 
for postgraduates, requires 4-5 years for a B.A. degree, 7-8 years for a Masters degree, 
and 10-11 years for a Ph.D. 
C 
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In China, education is considered to be “a project of vital and lasting importance, calling 
for a good educational foundation” (People’s Daily, May 15, 1987). For decades the 
educational policy has been to “enable everyone who receives an education to develop 
morally, intellectually and physically” (Liu 1989). One of the most remarkable changes 
seen in China today is in education at all levels (see Table 1). The percentage of no 
schooling has declined from 51.8% in 1964 to 16% in 1995. The most profound change 
is at the middle school level, where attendance has risen from only 8.32% in 1964 to 
39.29% in 1995 – almost 5 times as many as in 1964. 
 
 
Table 1  Population, Aged 6 and Over, by Educational Level in  
1964, 1982, 1990, and 1995 
 
 1964 1982 1990 1995 
 (in millions) % (in millions) % (in millions) % (in millions) % 
No schoolinga,b 258.05 51.80 283.68 31.88 182.25 18.77 179.38 16.02 
Primary school 192.00 39.30 355.35 39.94 420.21 43.25 475.26 42.45 
Middle school 41.46 8.32 244.73 27.50 353.27 36.36 439.97 39.29 
College and above 2.88 0.58 6.04 0.68 15.76 1.62 25.06 2.24 
Total  494.39  889.80  971.49  1119.67  
 
Based on State Statistical Bureau (1986b, 1993a, 1998); Population Institute (1985); Office of Population Survey 
(1997); Yao and Hua (1995). 
 
a No schooling includes the illiterate and semi-literate. 
b No schooling in 1990 covers only population aged 15 and over. 
 
 
The educational system in China is under the authority and guidance of the Ministry of 
Education of the central government. At the provincial level, education is administered 
by the educational bureau of the provincial government. For more than four decades, 
government expenditure on education has increased significantly. In 1953, the 
percentage of the educational share of the total government expenditure was 8.8%; in 
1994 it had increased to 16.91% (State Statistical Bureau 1995). Associated with the 
economic reform in the mid-1980s, the central government advocated parts of the 
university to be financed by various institutions under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Education or the authority of education at the provincial level. The objective of this 
policy is to expand higher education to suit the needs of economic development. The 
government policies have focused on two aspects concerning the increased fundamental 
education of the population. 
!
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2.1.1 Eradicating Illiteracy and Popularizing Nine Years of 
Educating the Population 
 
In the 1950s, there was a widespread movement to eradicate illiteracy in order to raise 
the listening and writing abilities of Chinese citizens. Around 70% of the total 
population were without formal schooling after World War II (1937-1945) and the civil 
war (1945-1949). In the 1960s, the implementation of an obligatory nine-year education 
!5 
policy began. This policy called for six years in primary school and three years in junior 
secondary school. The realization of this policy has been consistent in urban regions. 
However, in rural regions, it did not develop in the planned way in terms of financial 
assistance. Eventually, in 1986, the State Council set up and issued a “law of obligatory 
nine-year education of citizens” in order to meet the Chinese “four modernizations” 
(industry, agriculture, science and technology). Under this law, all persons are obliged 
to complete nine years of education, and the authorities at all levels must make this 
possible for everyone voluntarily. Since then, concrete action supporting nine years of 
education was taken everywhere in the rural regions. As a result, China has reached near 
universal enrolment in primary school-age children, and has rapidly increased the 
number of students in secondary schools. In 1997, the percentage of children enrolled in 
primary schools was 98.9%, while in 1952 it was only 49.2%. The percentage of 
graduates of primary school entering junior secondary school was 44.2% in 1957, and 
increased to 93.7% in 1997 (State Statistical Bureau 1998). However, it is necessary to 
mention that in spite of the rapid expansion in education, illiteracy in rural China is still 
high. 
 
 
2.1.2 Encouraging and Improving Women in Education 
 
When observing the changes in education, one of the most crucial phenomena to be 
considered is the participation of women in education. An important aspect of the state 
policies has always been to encourage women to enroll in schools at various levels. In 
China, a woman’s education is one of the important indicators of a woman’s social 
status, because a woman’s employment and domestic status prospects depend heavily 
on the training and educational schemes through which she can acquire the relevant 
skills. The Chinese government has made deliberate efforts to improve women’s status 
by ensuring equal opportunities in education. Therefore, the past four decades have 
witnessed a remarkable improvement in female education, which is not only a 
manifestation of the general improvement in the standing of females, but also an 
indication of the universal increase in female opportunities to receive education. 
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Figure 1  Development of Women’s Education 
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Data for the years 1966-1972 and 1989 are not available. Data from China All Women’s Federation (1991); 
Chinese Ministry of Education (1984, 1998); State Statistical Bureau (1993b, 1996, 1998).!
 
 
Figure 1 and Table 2 show a dramatic rise and changes in the proportion of women’s 
share of total students at all levels of education. In 1997, among all students, 37.32% 
were women in higher education, 45.46% in middle schools, and 47.63% in primary 
schools. In 1952, only 23.39% were women in universities, 23.50% in middle schools, 
and 32.9% in primary schools. This indicates a decline in the gender gap in education. 
Of course, this by no means excludes gender differences in education. In fact, when 
comparing the proportion of females enrolled with those of males, gender differences in 
all levels of education still exist, especially in rural China. 
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Table 2  Percentage of Women of Total Students at Stated Educational 
Level, 1949-1997 
 
Year College and above 
Middle 
school 
Primary 
school Year 
College  
and above 
Middle 
school 
Primary 
school 
1949 19.77   1974 33.76 38.10 43.70 
1950 21.20 26.50  1975 32.59 39.30 45.20 
1951 22.53 25.60 28.00 1976 33.02 40.10 45.50 
1952 23.39 23.50 32.90 1977 29.04 41.70 45.40 
1953 25.28 24.40 35.50 1978 24.11 41.50 44.90 
1954 26.27 25.00 33.30 1979 24.09 40.80 44.90 
1955 25.90 26.90 33.40 1980 23.44 39.60 44.60 
1956 24.60 29.30 35.20 1981 24.42 39.00 44.00 
1957 23.25 30.80 34.50 1982 26.50 39.30  
1958 23.30 31.30 38.50 1983 26.90 39.50  
1959 22.58 31.20 39.10 1984 28.60 40.00  
1960 24.50 31.20 39.10 1985 30.00 40.20 44.80 
1961 24.65 32.20 27.50 1986 25.50 40.70  
1962 25.34 34.10 34.80 1987 33.00 40.80  
1963 25.84 34.00  1988 33.40   
1964 25.73 34.10 35.00 1989    
1965 26.88 32.20  1990 33.70 41.90 46.20 
1966    1991 33.40 42.70 46.50 
1967    1992 33.70 43.10 46.60 
1968    1993 33.60 43.70 46.80 
1969    1994 34.50 44.30 47.10 
1970    1995 35.40 44.80 47.30 
1971    1996 36.40 45.30 47.50 
1972    1997 37.32 45.46 47.63 
1973 30.77 33.00 40.70     
 
Data for the years 1966-1972 and 1989 are not available. Data from China All Women’s Federation (1991);  
Chinese Ministry of Education (1984, 1998); State Statistical Bureau (1993b, 1996, 1998). 
 
 
Another important aspect of education in China is that it is regionally unbalanced; 
particularly, the disparities are very large between rural and urban regions. On the one 
hand, the development of education is unequal, because “the primary functional sub-
systems of a society, the economic, the polity, the integrative sub-system, and latent 
pattern-maintenance sub-system, each constitutes part of the situation for each of the 
other” (Parsons and Smelser 1964:51). On the other hand, education is an important 
active participant in the socioeconomic process. Therefore, educational systems have 
differential impacts on various aspects of development and social change. 
 
The educational distributions by age and rural/urban regions, calculated from the 
National 1% Population Sample Survey 1995 (Office of Population Survey 1997) show 
that there are great disparities between rural and urban China (see population pyramids 
below). 
!
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Generally, the educational success in both rural and urban China is likely to continue as 
young generations move up the age pyramid. But the level of education at all degrees is 
much higher for the urban than for the rural population. Obviously, there was a much 
larger proportion of the urban population in the middle school level in each age group. 
Also, the rural/urban disparities by gender are pronounced. The rural population with 
low educational levels has the highest gender difference. The level of no schooling 
among ages 15 and above was higher for females than for males. Intake in middle 
schools for females aged 30 and above was about half that of males. Observations from 
the rural and urban pyramids indicate that rural males and females should be targeted 
for educational and development services. Furthermore, cultural barriers to women’s 
education in rural China have to be ameliorated somewhat through programs 
specifically addressed in this issue. 
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2.2 Fertility Differentials by Rural and Urban Region 
 
The differences in total fertility rate (TFR) between urban and rural populations over the 
past decades can be seen in Figure 2. Urban fertility rates were even lower during the 
early 1950s, before the government initiated birth control policies. The government’s 
first family planning campaign took place in the mid-1950s, when the government 
began to manufacture contraceptives and relax restrictions on induced abortion. The 
urban fertility transition began as early as 1954, when the TFR was 5.72. It then fell to 
5.67 in 1955, to 5.33 in 1956, and to 5.25 in 1958. Urban TFR was very low (2.98) in 
1961, at half of the 1957 level, as a consequence of starvation between 1959-1961. 
Urban fertility as a proportion of rural fertility dropped greatly in the 1960s: from 76% 
in 1962 to 53% in 1969. This disparity demonstrates the relatively early timing of the 
urban fertility transition. In 1963 the baby boom took place. Since then, urban China has 
experienced unprecedented fertility declines. By the middle of the 1970s, the urban 
fertility rate had already reached the replacement level. By this time, the government 
had given full attention to and taken concrete action for family planning by encouraging 
late marriages and fewer births. The rapid urban fertility decline during the 1970s 
coincided not only with the intensification of the family planning program, but also with 
the development of education and other socioeconomic factors and processes. 
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Figure 2  Differences in TFR between Urban and Rural Populations, 
1950-1995 
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Data based on: for 1950-1979, State Family Planning Commission (1982); for 1980-1988, State Family Planning 
Commission (1988); for 1989 and 1990, State Statistical Bureau (1993a); for 1991 and 1992, State Family  
Planning Commission (1992); for 1995, Office of Population Survey (1997). 
 
 
Fertility changes in China have been categorized as “induced” and “natural” (Wang 
1991). The former reflects government intervention hastening fertility decline; the latter 
reflects a fertility transition accompanied by socioeconomic development, such as 
increased family income, improvement of education, and promotion of social welfare 
services. Experiences of rural fertility transition have been considered as an induced 
decline. In contrast with urban fertility declines, in 1961 the rural fertility rate fell to 
3.35 due to starvation. By 1962 the rural fertility rate was 6.30; this was not the case in 
urban regions until 1963. Between 1963-1970, a big baby boom took place. The rural 
population began its fertility transition at a rate of 7.03 in 1968, then fell to 6.26 in 
1969, to 6.38 in 1970. The TFR in rural China has rapidly declined since full-scale 
implementation of family planning policies began throughout China in 1971. Although 
the specific requirements of greater population control were not strictly adhered to 
during the 1970s, the TFR fell from 6.01 in 1971 to 3.05 in 1979. Eventually, the TFR 
of rural China dropped to 2.48 in 1981 when the State Council put forward the strict 
family policy: only one child per couple. By 1995, the TFR of rural China reached 2.0. 
Fertility change in rural China has indicated that successful implementation of the birth 
planning program has played an important role in contributing to lower levels of rural 
fertility. 
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2.3 Fertility Differentials by Educational Level 
 
Over the years, various associations have been examined between education and fertility 
in underlying policy issues, theory, methodology, and empirical evidence. Empirical 
studies around the world show negative statistical associations between education and 
fertility in demographic change. Cochrane (1979, quoted in Eloundou-Enyegue 
1999:289) says: “education does not affect fertility directly, but acts through many 
variables such as the biological supply of children, the demand for children by husbands 
and wives, and the regulation of fertility.” Moreover, some researchers have extended 
the analysis to examine the specific benefits responsible for the effects of schooling on 
fertility. 
 
Here, rather than to theoretically and methodologically discuss the effects of education 
on fertility, we empirically look at more insights of education-fertility interactions based 
on the 1990 population census (State Statistical Bureau 1993a). 
 
 
Table 3  Age-Specific Fertility Rates (per 1,000) for Females by 
Educational Level, Rural/Urban Regions, and for All of China in 1990 
!
Age group Total No schooling Primary school Middle school College and above 
Rural      
TFR 2.58 3.00 2.59 2.43 1.59 
15-19 25.92 50.43 30.61 14.50 1.11 
20-24 218.69 255.42 227.03 199.71 73.77 
25-29 173.06 186.25 172.48 168.74 179.17 
30-34 65.68 68.54 60.33 72.57 41.69 
35-39 23.17 27.29 19.99 24.92 18.81 
40-44 7.04 9.46 5.59 5.01 3.65 
45-49 2.01 2.24 1.78 1.54 0.53 
Urban      
TFR 1.59 2.55 2.08 1.48 1.31 
15-19 10.14 48.00 28.21 6.59 0.14 
20-24 143.08 232.45 196.98 139.64 44.36 
25-29 117.72 152.42 132.05 110.30 170.20 
30-34 34.16 54.47 44.59 28.86 34.30 
35-39 10.67 17.36 11.36 8.90 10.03 
40-44 2.10 4.44 2.08 1.43 1.70 
45-49 0.71 1.15 0.68 0.53 0.34 
All China      
TFR 2.29 2.96 2.52 1.99 1.32 
15-19 21.99 50.30 30.40 11.39 0.18 
20-24 198.81 253.96 223.93 176.21 46.88 
25-29 155.55 183.37 167.37 142.65 170.66 
30-34 55.74 67.04 57.68 48.24 34.58 
35-39 19.56 26.16 18.25 14.87 10.37 
40-44 5.67 8.88 4.79 2.81 1.77 
45-49 1.63 2.09 1.46 0.89 0.35 
!
Calculations based on State Statistical Bureau (1993a). 
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As can be seen in Table 3, fertility has declined as a result of better education. In each 
age group there is an inverse relationship between age-specific fertility and educational 
levels. A higher educational level is associated with lower TFR. In China as a whole, 
the most dramatic change in fertility has occurred among women with middle school 
and college education. The TFR of women with no schooling is more than twice that of 
women with college education, and 1.5 times higher than those with middle school 
education. Thus, education appears to be an active factor influencing fertility rate 
beyond the national family planning guidelines. 
 
The Chinese experience has shown that education affects women’s fertility through the 
path of delaying marriage and thereby delaying a woman’s entrance into her 
reproductive life. The age at first marriage is highly and positively correlated to 
education. According to the women’s marriage survey in 1987 (Sha 1994:72), the 
average age at first marriage was 25.89 for college level, 23.05 for middle school, 21.08 
for primary school, and 20.14 for women with no schooling. Women with a middle 
school or higher education are more likely to marry later, and hence give birth to fewer 
children than their less educated counterparts. Thus, the educated women use their 
human capital resources in the labor market while they reduce their time allocation for 
familial roles such as bearing and rearing children.  
 
Furthermore, when comparing the fertility rates of urban and rural women at all 
educational levels, women in rural areas have a higher fertility rate than their city-
dwelling counterparts. The rural-urban fertility differentials at the same educational 
level suggest that the fertility decline is a result of multiple interactions of socio-
economic factors, not only of education alone. 
 
 
2.4 Son Preference and the Unusually High Sex Ratio of Infants 
 
China has had a traditional culture of male preference for thousands of years. Males 
play the major role in carrying on the family line, labor participation and old-age 
security, therefore, parents tend to value sons over daughters. Although this traditional 
culture has been gradually weakening with the social changes in China, since the 1980s, 
the sex ratio of males to females at birth has been increasing steadily. Some people still 
wish to have at least one son in their small families, therefore, fertility behavior is 
different for women with and without sons. Son-preference is common in many parts of 
China, especially in rural areas, where the levels of socioeconomic development are 
relatively low. The effects of sex preference on fertility behavior are reflected in the 
selection of the sex of children through medical technologies. 
 
Since the 1980s, the sex ratio at birth has been rising steadily (see Table 4). In China as 
a whole, the sex ratio rose from 107.63 in 1982 (the third census) to 111.75 in 1990 (the 
fourth census). In 1995, the high sex ratio of infants became more serious: it was as high 
as 116.57, and increased by 4.82 compared to 111.75 in 1990. The unusual high sex 
ratio of infants in recent years has attracted much attention from demographers and the 
government departments concerned. 
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As an explanation to the high infant sex ratio in China – although there is no common 
conclusion – the more concentrated suggestions are: 1) sex selection through medical 
technologies (selective abortion before the birth); and 2) under-reporting of female 
births or false reporting of early deaths of girls as stillborns. Some demographers 
believe that selective abortion before birth and under-reporting on female infants may 
be the main reasons. 
 
Chinese demographers have found that there is a strong relationship between the sex 
ratio of infants and the sex composition of children (Hao 1997). A woman, whose first 
child is a boy, is more likely to want a one-child certificate than a woman, whose first 
child is a girl; at all parities, women with few or no sons are less likely to be using 
contraceptives than those with many sons. Also, the probability of having a second birth 
for women with one daughter is higher than for those with one son; and the probability 
of a third birth for women with two daughters is significantly higher than for those with 
one son and one daughter. Moreover, as Table 4 indicates, place of residence also 
affects the infant sex ratio; the rural infant sex ratio is higher than the urban one. 
However, there are further questions ahead for Chinese demographers: How does the 
son-preference influence the fertility behavior of the population in general? How large 
has the influence been? Will the son-preference hamper further fertility decline? 
 
 
Table 4  The Sex Ratio of Infants 
!
Year Male Female Sex Ratio 
All China 
1953 9,716,971 9,264,877 104.88 
1964 14,509,500 13,974,327 103.83 
1982 10,787,028 10,022,319 107.63 
1990 12,254,905 10,965,946 111.75 
1995 9,274,600 7,956,200 116.57 
Rural    
1990 9,846,920 8,787,090 112.06 
1995 7,018,600 5,960,700 117.75 
Towna    
1990 731,060 649,130 112.62 
1995 707,500 612,000 115.60 
Citya    
1990 1,701,050 1,558,370 109.16 
1995 1,548,400 1,383,600 111.91 
 
Calculations based on Office of Population Survey (1997); Office of Census (1991); Population Institute (1985); 
State Statistical Bureau (1986a, 1986b, 1993a, 1996); Yao (1995). 
a See Section 3.1.1 for definition of town and city. 
 
!
!
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2.5 Fast Growing Rural-to-Urban Migration 
 
Since the mid-1980s, rural-to-urban migration has been an important factor in 
demographic change. One of the major consequences of the economic reforms in China 
has been a rise in population mobility. Rural-to-urban migration is a dynamic force in 
the transition from a planned to a market-oriented economy. 
 
Although there are numerous methodological problems in the classification of rural 
migration, generally, the so-called floating rural laborers, who are moving across 
provinces, are estimated at around 56 million (Jia and Meng 1996). Of these, 70%-80% 
are working in cities and other urban areas (Cai 1995). Thus, rural migrant labor is 
estimated at approximately 45 million. Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong each host 
about 10 million migrants (Yang 1997). 
 
There are deep socioeconomic reasons for the fast growing rural-to-urban migration. 
The quantities of rural-to-urban migration are largely determined by continuing 
population growth; dramatic changes in the structure of agricultural production; a 
rapidly growing urban economy and agglomerates; implementation of the family 
responsibility system and a dual household registration system. 
 
Prior to 1978, the distribution of the population resulted from the implementation of a 
traditional economic development strategy, which placed its first priority on heavy 
industry. This strategy created barriers for migration in two ways. 1) Industrial growth 
by heavy industry created few employment opportunities to absorb surplus rural 
laborers. 2) A planned labor force allocation had made interregional and inter-sectoral 
migration impossible. In addition, a household registration (“hukou“) system was 
introduced to prevent rural laborers from moving into cities. The hukou system is 
analogous to an internal passport system, or at least to a “green card” system. This 
system created different opportunities and constraints for holders of the urban hukou or 
rural hukou status. Under such a system, the rural population could not change their 
residential status and occupational identity as they liked. As a result, despite the change 
of composition in national output value when agricultural production dropped from 
57.7% in 1952 to 32.8% in 1978, employment structure did not change accordingly. The 
agricultural labor force only decreased from 83.5% in 1952 to 70.5% in 1978. 
Corresponding to this was a rise in the urbanization level: 17.9% in 1978 versus 12.5% 
in 1952. Since migration was strictly controlled, it was difficult for farmers to change 
their jobs and residential status. Hence, a large amount of surplus labor accumulated in 
the rural areas, associated with the technological development of agriculture. China now 
faces stronger pressure for rural labor force transference and land annexation. 
According to estimates by the Population Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, the proportion of rural labor surplus of total rural labor is 31.53% for all of 
China (Cai 1995). Because the differences between provinces is very substantial, the 
direction of migration and of the labor movement appears to be from central and west to 
east, and from rural to urban areas. 
 
With the transition from a planned to a market-oriented economy, the household 
registration system in urban China tends to be a dual-track system, the so-called 
“planned” track and “outside-of-planned” track. In the planned track, rural-to-urban 
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migration is still constrained by a highly controlled household registration system. Only 
hukou migration (i.e. migration with permanent residency rights) is considered as 
planned migration. The scale of migration through the changing of permanent residence 
has not advanced enough to correct the distorted population distribution, so that 
migration “without plan” has become a necessity. Migration without residency rights, 
the so-called “floating” population, is outside of the state plans. They are not supposed 
to stay in the destination permanently. However, a large outside-of-planned track 
migration actually plays a substantial role in the urban economy and the urbanization 
process. They demand low-wage rural labor in China’s urban areas. Many construction 
companies already hire their unskilled workers directly from rural areas. The booming 
towns and cities also offer numerous opportunities for rural laborers to start a small 
private business. 
 
It is necessary to address three points. 1) A large rural-to-urban migration outside of the 
state plans is often not reflected in the official statistics. 2) Most migrants come from 
the floating population; at a low degree they are expected to become permanent citizens. 
Their place of destination is not fixed, and their duration of stay is temporary. 3) The 
duality of migration is an outcome of the different levels of socioeconomic development 
in cities and in the countryside, including labor market segmentation based on the hukou 
system. These points are preconditions to understanding Chinese rural-to-urban 
migration. 
 
 
2.6 Fast Population Aging 
 
Chinese population aging appeared in the population age distribution in the mid-1970s. 
Since the 1980s it has steadily increased along with the significant fertility decline and a 
stable increase in life expectancy. In the 1990s it has become more serious (see Table 
5). 
 
Table 5   Age Distribution (in %) of the Total Population by Rural,  
Urban, and All China, 1953-1995 
 
Age group 1953 1964 1982 1990 1995 
All China      
0-14 36.28 40.69 33.59 27.62 26.73 
15-19 56.40 53.18 58.77 63.81 63.10 
60 and over 7.32 6.13 7.64 8.57 10.17 
Median age 22.70 20.20 22.90 25.30 27.70 
Rural      
0-14   35.40 29.59 28.72 
15-19   56.80 61.69 61.29 
60 and over   7.80 8.72 9.99 
Towna      
0-14   28.31 23.70 23.50 
15-19   65.29 69.10 66.95 
60 and over   6.40 7.20 9.54 
Citya      
0-14   26.00 21.88 21.09 
15-19   66.60 69.50 67.90 
60 and over   7.40 8.62 11.01 
 
Data based on: for 1953-1982, Institute of Population (1985); for 1990, Office of Census (1991); for 1995,  
Office of Population Survey (1997).  a See Section 3.1.1 for definition of town and city. 
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Between 1964-1995, the median age declined by 7.5 years. The proportion age 60 and 
older increased by 2.4% from 1982 to 1990, and reached 10.7% in 1995. The proportion 
age 0-4 decreased by 7.1% between 1964 and 1982, and by 6.86% from 1982 to 1995. It 
is obvious that the speed of population aging has become quicker since the 1980s. In the 
geographical aspect, the speed of population aging in cities is faster than in the country. 
From 1982 to 1995, the proportion age 60 and older in cities increased by 3.61%, 
whereas in rural areas it rose by 2.19%. 
 
Population aging is a global phenomenon. However, when comparing the more 
developed countries (MDC) with the less developed countries (LDC), the type of aging 
is different, when the entire age distribution is considered. “MDCs are ‘aging from the 
middle,’ whereas LDCs are ‘aging from the bottom.’… In MDCs, aging is reducing the 
size of the labor force, as the proportion of 15-59 year olds in the population declines. In 
LDCs, aging is increasing the size of the labor force: the proportion in the middle age 
group remains constant and population is redistributed, ... from the under-15 group, 
where labor force participation is very low, to the over-60 age group, where labor force 
participation is substantial, especially in low-income countries” (MacKellar 1997:5). 
When we consider the size of the labor force, Chinese population aging fits the LDC 
pattern. Since the 1960s, the size of the labor force in China has maintained a stable and 
sustained development: it reached 590 million in 1982, and increased to 723 million in 
1990, then rose to 760 million in 1995. Currently, China is in the golden period of labor 
resource. 
 
The aging of the Chinese population has developed its own characteristics when 
compared to other LDCs as well as to MDCs. Aging in China started late and developed 
fast. It usually takes 50-100 years for industrialized countries to change from a country 
with a young population to a country with an aged population. But in China, this 
process took only 30 years. The population aging of MDCs developed gradually 
following high economic development, while in China aging occurred during a period 
of low economic development. China now has the largest aged population in the world, 
and must deal with the social security issues of an aged population. Although at present, 
the proportion of the aged population and the old-age dependency ratio in China are 
more favorable than in the MDCs, they will deteriorate rapidly and soon surpass the 
levels of western industrialized countries, as well as the former socialist countries of 
central and eastern Europe, causing similar problems. And with a much lower level of 
income in China, the solution of the problem becomes even more difficult. 
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Section 3 Base Data and Scenario Assumption for 
   the Next 50 Years 
 
 
 
he tools of a multi-state population projection allow the projection of a population 
by several characteristics, such as age, sex, education and place of residence. In 
particular, educational levels have been introduced into the model as one of the assumed 
main sources of population heterogeneity. Thus, specific sets of assumptions are applied 
to educational groups linked with fertility, mortality and migration patterns. 
 
 
3.1 Base Data 
 
As required by the multi-state population projection by educational level, the base data 
is divided into age, sex, educational level, rural and urban region. The base data for the 
Chinese projection is derived from four major sources: 
 
1) National 1% Population Sample Survey 1995 (Office of Population Survey 1997), 
conducted by the State Statistical Bureau of China. This large-scale survey on 
national strength and condition after the 1990 population census, provided a reliable 
basis for the data of the starting year: population by age, sex, educational level, as 
well as by rural and urban region, fertility and mortality by age and region, registered 
rural-to-urban migration. 
 
2) National Population Census 1990 (State Statistical Bureau 1993a) served as a 
reference for estimating the fertility rate by education and by rural/urban region for 
women aged 15-49. 
 
3) Survey Data on the Chinese Support System for the Elderly (National Research 
Center on Aging 1992) allowed us to construct the population aged 60-80 by 
educational level. 
 
4) Sampling Survey, Data on Chinese Migration in 74 Cities and Towns in 1986 
(Institute of Population Studies 1988). This was a key project of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences and the P50 Program of the United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA, New York). It provided detailed information about educational levels 
of migrants by sex and age. It is available to estimate the educational structure of 
migration. 
 
In the National 1% Population Sample Survey 1995 (Office of Population Survey 
1997), the data on urban and rural population, levels of education, and migration are 
based on the following concepts. 
 
 
 
 
T 
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3.1.1 Urban and Rural Population 
 
Urban population includes all people living in cities and towns with permanent 
residency rights. City population refers to people with permanent residency rights 
living in the districts of cities that are sub-divided into districts, or living in the street 
communities of cities that are not sub-divided into districts. Town population refers to 
people with permanent residency rights living in neighborhood communities under the 
jurisdiction of cities that are not sub-divided into districts, or living in neighborhood 
communities of towns directly under country jurisdiction. Rural population refers to 
all people not living in cities and towns, who are without permanent residency rights of 
a city or town, and are living in rural areas. 
 
 
3.1.2 Concept of Level of Education 
 
No schooling refers to those who are illiterate or semi-literate. Primary school refers to 
those who have completed the final grade at the first level of education. Normally, this 
takes six years in China. Middle school refers to those who have completed the final 
grade at a senior secondary school and a junior secondary school, or a vocational 
secondary school, or a technical training school. College and above refers to those who 
have completed the final degree at a university or college, as well as a college for post-
graduates, including universities and colleges for adults. 
 
 
3.1.3 Concept of Migration 
 
Migration refers to those who have left a rural region, where they were registered as 
residents, and have lived or worked continuously for more than one-half year in cities or 
towns without permanent residency rights of the city or town, but have been registered 
as temporary residents. 
 
 
3.2 A Brief Explanation of the Base-Line Input Data 
 
 
3.2.1 Modified Fertility in 1995 
 
The TFR calculated directly according to the 1% survey in 1995 was 1.46 (Office of 
Population Survey 1997). Does such a low figure reflect the current level of fertility in 
China? The TFR in 1989 was 2.25, according to China’s 1990 population census (State 
Statistical Bureau 1993a). In 1991 it was 1.65, according to the sample survey of 
380,000 people conducted by the Family Planning Committee (1991). The adjusted 
TFR was 2.20 (Zeng 1996). The State Statistical Bureau (SSB) obviously believed that 
the TFR is lower (1.46). The main reason for such low fertility was the under-reporting 
of the data on births and fertility. This has happened in different population sample 
surveys in recent years (Zhang et al. 1997). To make an accurate evaluation of China’s 
fertility level in the mid-1990s, the SSB adjusted the TFR of 1995. The adjustment was 
based on the total birth rate of the 1995 survey (Office of Population Survey 1997), 
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which was 17.12 per thousand. This figure was obtained by adjusting sample errors and 
enumeration errors, and reflected more accurately the actual status of births. According 
to this figure, the adjusted TFR of 1995 was 1.85 for the whole country. According to 
the proportional relationship between the surveyed TFR of all China, and the TFR of 
cities, towns, and rural areas, the adjustment on the TFR for cities was 1.43, for towns 
1.58, and for rural areas 2. 
 
The base-year fertility data by education used in the multi-state projection was 
estimated in three steps. First, in light of the adjustment on TFR by the SSB in 1995, we 
adjusted the age-specific fertility rate (see Table 6a). Second, we estimated the fertility 
differentials by education, based on the fertility level of all educational categories, 
according to the 1990 population census (see Table 6b). Finally, we calculated the age-
specific fertility rate by education according to the results of the first and second steps. 
 
 
Table 6a  Estimated TFR by Region in 1995, as Adjusted by the State 
Statistical Bureau (Department of Population and Employment) 
 
Region TFR Modified TFR Differential TFR 
All China 1.46 1.85 0.39 
City 1.13 1.43 0.30 
Town 1.25 1.58 0.33 
Rural 1.58 2.00 0.42 
 
Source: Zhang et al. (1997) 
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Table 6b  Estimated Age-Specific Fertility Rates (ASFR) and TFR by 
Region in 1995 
 
Age group ASFR and TFR Ratio ASFR/TFR Estimated ASFR and TFR 
Rural    
15-19 0.07 0.04 0.08 
20-24 0.85 0.54 1.08 
25-29 0.47 0.30 0.60 
30-34 0.15 0.09 0.19 
35-39 0.03 0.02 0.04 
40-44 0.01 0.01 0.01 
45-49 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Total 1.58 1.00 2.00 
Town    
15-19 0.03 0.02 0.04 
20-24 0.66 0.53 0.84 
25-29 0.43 0.34 0.54 
30-34 0.10 0.08 0.13 
35-39 0.02 0.02 0.03 
40-44 0.01 0.00 0.01 
45-49 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 1.25 1.00 1.58 
City    
15-19 0.02 0.02 0.03 
20-24 0.54 0.49 0.70 
25-29 0.43 0.39 0.56 
30-34 0.10 0.09 0.13 
35-39 0.02 0.02 0.02 
40-44 0.00 0.00 0.00 
45-49 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 1.13 1.00 1.43 
All China    
15-19 0.05 0.04 0.07 
20-24 0.77 0.53 0.98 
25-29 0.46 0.32 0.58 
30-34 0.13 0.09 0.17 
35-39 0.03 0.02 0.04 
40-44 0.01 0.01 0.01 
45-49 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 1.46 1.00 1.85 
 
Calculations are based on Office of Population Survey (1997) 
 
 
3.2.2 The Age Group 5-9 in 1995 
 
Through the population pyramid below, we can see that the size of the cohort aged 5-9 
is much larger than either the 10-14 or 0-4 group. There are two basic causes for this. 
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First, the “echo effect” of the baby boom from 1963 to the early 1970s. The age 5-9 
cohort was born between 1985 and 1990; they are children of the large baby boom 
generation. In 1983, more than 29 million young Chinese born during the baby boom 
would marry and have their children. This baby boom created great pressure on Chinese 
population control in terms of first marriage and births in most of the 1980s. Second, the 
effect of the New Marriage Law in 1981, which lowered the legal age of marriage from 
23 to 20 (for women). Accordingly, the mean age at first marriage has declined, and a 
dramatic increase in the number of married people was expected as the baby boom 
generation reached the legal age of marriage. For example, 18% of the women were 
married by age 23 or younger in 1980. This increased to 30.8% in 1982, and to 28.3% in 
1983. The impact of the fluctuation resulting from the change of the legal marriage age 
has been gradually eliminated since the late 1980s. 
 
 
!
Source: Office of Population Survey (1997) 
 
 
3.2.3 Estimated Rural-to-Urban Migration by Education and Age 
 
Analyzing data for rural-to-urban migration is not an easy task. There is no exact 
definition for rural-to-urban migration in different estimates. The data of total net 
migration has been calculated according to the 1% population survey in 1995 (Office of 
Population Survey 1997). However, because of a lack of accurate data on rural to urban 
by level of education, the age, sex and educational structures have been estimated, based 
on the survey data of the Institute of Population Studies (1988) since it provides the 
educational level of migration for males and females, as well as for age groups. 
 
!
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3.2.4 Estimated Population Age 60 and Above by Education 
 
Survey data on the Chinese support system for the elderly (National Research Center on 
Aging 1992) gives the proportion of the population in each educational category for 
ages 60-100. The proportion of each educational level is applied to the same age group 
in 1995 for the projection. 
 
 
3.2.5 Data on Mortality Not Estimated by Education 
 
Unfortunately, due to a lack of accurate data on mortality by level of education, the 
same base-year data on mortality levels is used for all educational levels in the multi-
state projection. 
 
 
3.3 Sets of Scenario Assumptions for Future Projection 
 
The usual way to produce scenario assumptions, which combine the alternative three 
basic demographic components fertility, mortality and migration, is to operate through 
one of these three factors. In our multi-state population projection, education combines 
with fertility, mortality and migration in a scenario approach. Also, the place of 
residence (rural or urban) is considered as a variant. 
 
The scenarios for education are obtained from that principle. Fertility is low among 
women with higher education, in a period when educational levels are increasing. 
Women with higher education tend to take the lead in reducing their fertility, and a 
fertility gap appears (Yousif et al. 1996). The weight of each educational category is 
hypothesized to change by increasing the educational transition rate among different 
educational levels, which link with the low, central and high demographic assumptions, 
so that the impact of education on future population size and population structure will 
be tested. 
 
The following scenario matrix (Table 7) and tables of summarized assumptions (Tables 
8-14) present nine sets of scenarios for rural and urban Chinese population projection 
over 50 years. The national population projection is aggregated from the results of the 
rural and urban projections. Each scenario combines low, central, and high assumptions 
on fertility, mortality, migration, and education. Each scenario assumption (low, central, 
and high) combines with another three scenarios: no convergence, education converged, 
education and region converged. The base year parameters of each area remain the same 
in all nine scenarios. 
 
The low scenario implies that fertility and mortality will decline with the increase in 
higher education by the end of the projection period. The TFR is expected to continue to 
drop to 1.7 in rural areas, 1.29 in urban regions, 1.56 at the national level. The 
assumptions of low mortality, which lead to an increase in life expectancy at birth, 
range between 1.79 to 2.10 years (per decade) for rural men and women, and at about 
1.65 years for both sexes in urban China. Consistent with declining fertility and 
mortality rates, we assume that the highest transition rates achieved by the end of the 
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projection period in rural regions will be 100 for males and females with no schooling 
to primary school. For those with primary to middle school education, they will be 90 
for males and 85 for females. Those with middle school to college and above levels, 
they will be between 8 to 10. These assumptions show that the middle school level is 
rising quickly in rural areas. For urban regions, the highest transition rates are 100 from 
primary to middle school, and 35 from middle school to college level and above for 
both males and females. In both rural and urban regions, we assume that there are no 
illiterate or semi-literate. The scenario of net rural-to-urban migration is expected to 
increase at a very low level, since it is still under the strict control of the urban 
household registration system. 
 
In the central scenario, fertility by different educational category will remain constant 
until the end of the projection period, at the same level as the base year 1995 in rural 
and urban regions. At the national level, TFR is aggregated to be between 1.75 and 1.86. 
In rural China, life expectancy will increase by 6.73 years for men and 6.74 years for 
women by the end of the projection period. A moderate rise in net migration is 
expected. The transition rates for men in rural China are at the same level as the low 
scenario assumption for no schooling to primary and primary to middle school. The 
transition rate for middle school to college and above is assumed lower than in the low 
scenario. For rural females, the transition rates are lower than for males for middle 
school and college and above, i.e., 75 for primary to middle school, 4 for middle school 
to college and above. For urban China, we assume that the gender gap disappears in all 
levels, and that the transition rates are the same as in the low educational scenario, 
except for transition rates for middle school to college and above, which are lower than 
in the low educational scenario. 
 
The high scenario considers high assumptions for fertility, mortality and net migration, 
and low assumptions for education. We assume that TFR will increase to slightly over 
replacement level, between 2.12 to 2.32 (aggregated) at the national level. The high 
scenario for fertility assumes that the policy of family planning will be more relaxed, 
especially to a great extent in cities. Under the assumption of slow-declining mortality, 
the life expectancy rises 1.6 years for men and 1.84 years for women per decade in rural 
regions, and 1.35 years for both males and females in urban regions. With the high 
assumption for migration, we expect that total net migration will be largely expanded 
under a gradual relaxation of the urban household registration system. The low 
education hypothesizes that there are no improvements in various levels of education, 
and educational levels remain constant as of the starting year 1995. 
 
No convergence refers to fertility differentials by educational levels, and by rural/urban 
residency which is held constant at the base year 1995. 
 
Education converged means that the fertility differentials by education will decline; a 
convergence of fertility levels across educational categories takes place, but the 
distinction of fertility between rural and urban is not declining. 
 
Education and region converged implies a convergence of fertility levels in 
educational categories and in rural/urban regions; fertility differentials by education and 
rural/urban residency are declining. 
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Table 7  Scenario Matrix 
!
 Low Scenarioa Central Scenariob High Scenarioc 
No convergence L1 C1 H1 
Education converged L2 C2 H2 
Education and region 
converged 
L3 C3 H3 
!
a Low fertility, low mortality, high education, low migration 
b Central, fertility, central mortality, central education, central migration 
c High fertility, high mortality, low education, high migration!
!
!
Table 8  Base Year Parameters and Low Scenario Assumptions  
for Rural China in 2045 
!
 Base year 1995 Scenario L1 Scenario L2 Scenario L3 
TFR     
Total population 2.00 1.70 1.70 1.50 
No schooling 2.33 2.00 1.75 1.50 
Primary school 2.01 1.80 1.73 1.50 
Middle school  1.91 1.70 1.71 1.50 
College and above 1.22 1.20 1.49 1.50 
Life expectancy (in years)    
Male 67.61 76.54 76.54 76.54 
Female 71.86 82.34 82.34 82.34 
Educational transition from no schooling to primary school (in percentage) 
Male 95.31 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Female 89.95 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Educational transition from primary school to middle school (in percentage) 
Male 72.04 90.00 90.00 90.00 
Female 61.20 85.00 85.00 85.00 
Educational transition from middle school to college and above (in percentage) 
Male 0.93 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Female 0.69 8.00 8.00 8.00 
Migration (in millions)    
Total  -6.31 -11.06 -11.06 -11.06 
No schooling  -0.67 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 
Primary school -1.34 -2.35 -2.35 -2.35 
Middle school -3.61 -6.33 -6.33 -6.33 
College and above -0.69 -1.22 -1.22 -1.22 
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Table 9  Base Year Parameters and Central Scenario Assumptions  
for Rural China in 2045 
 
 Base year 1995 Scenario C1 Scenario C2 Scenario C3 
TFR      
Total population 2.00 1.92 1.91 1.82 
No schooling 2.33 2.33 1.91 1.82 
Primary school 2.01 2.01 1.91 1.82 
Middle school  1.91 1.91 1.91 1.82 
College and above 1.22 1.22 1.91 1.82 
Life expectancy (in years)    
Male 67.61 75.68 75.68 75.68 
Female 71.86 81.07 81.07 81.07 
Educational transition from no schooling to primary school (in percentage) 
Male 95.31 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Female 89.95 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Educational transition from primary school to middle school (in percentage) 
Male 72.04 90.00 90.00 90.00 
Female 61.20 75.00 75.00 75.00 
Educational transition from middle school to college and above (in percentage) 
Male 0.93 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Female 0.69 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Migration (in millions) 
Total -6.31 -30.81 -30.81 -30.81 
No schooling -0.67 -3.25 -3.25 -3.25 
Primary school -1.34 -6.55 -6.55 -6.55 
Middle school -3.61 -17.62 -17.62 -17.62 
College and above -0.69 -3.39 -3.39 -3.39 
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Table 10  Base Year Parameters and High Scenario Assumptions  
for Rural China in 2045 
 
 Base year 1995 Scenario H1 Scenario H2 Scenario H3 
TFR      
Total population 2.00 2.38 2.29 2.29 
No schooling 2.33 2.73 2.29 2.29 
Primary school 2.01 2.40 2.29 2.29 
Middle school  1.91 2.33 2.29 2.29 
College and above 1.22 1.66 2.29 2.29 
Life expectancy (in years)    
Male 67.61 74.49 74.49 74.49 
Female 71.86 79.08 79.08 79.08 
Educational transition from no schooling to primary school (in percentage) 
Male 95.31 95.31 95.31 95.31 
Female 89.95 89.95 89.95 89.95 
Educational transition from primary school to middle school (in percentage) 
Male 72.04 72.04 72.04 72.04 
Female 61.20 61.20 61.20 61.20 
Educational transition from middle school to college and above (in percentage) 
Male 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
Female 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 
Migration (in millions) 
Total -6.31 -50.18 -50.18 -50.18 
No schooling -0.67 -5.30 -5.30 -5.30 
Primary school -1.34 -10.66 -10.66 -10.66 
Middle school -3.61 -28.70 -28.70 -28.70 
College and above -0.69 -5.52 -5.52 -5.52 
!
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Table 11  Base Year Parameters and Low Scenario Assumptions  
for Urban China in 2045 
 
 Base year 1995 Scenario L1 Scenario L2 Scenario L3 
TFR     
Total population 1.48 1.29 1.29 1.50 
No schooling 2.32 2.00 1.32 1.50 
Primary school 1.92 1.70 1.31 1.50 
Middle school  1.42 1.32 1.29 1.50 
College and above 1.21 1.20 1.29 1.50 
Life expectancy (in years)    
Male 71.17 79.39 79.39 79.39 
Female 76.15 84.39 84.39 84.39 
Educational transition from no schooling to primary school (in percentage) 
Male 98.40 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Female 97.69 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Educational transition from primary school to middle school (in percentage) 
Male  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Female  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Educational transition from middle school to college and above (in percentage) 
Male 12.63 35.00 35.00 35.00 
Female 11.34 35.00 35.00 35.00 
Migration (in millions) 
Total 6.31 11.07 11.07 11.07 
No schooling 0.67 1.17 1.17 1.17 
Primary school 1.34 2.35 2.35 2.35 
Middle school 3.61 6.33 6.33 6.33 
College and above 0.69 1.22 1.22 1.22 
!
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Table 12  Base Year Parameters and Central Scenario Assumptions for 
Urban China in 2045 
 
 Base year 1995 Scenario C1 Scenario C2 Scenario C3 
TFR     
Total population 1.48 1.38 1.42 1.82 
No schooling 2.32 2.32 1.42 1.82 
Primary school 1.92 1.92 1.42 1.82 
Middle school  1.42 1.42 1.42 1.82 
College and above 1.21 1.21 1.42 1.82 
Life expectancy (in years)    
Male 71.17 77.90 77.90 77.90 
Female 76.15 82.89 82.89 82.89 
Educational transition from no schooling to primary school (in percentage) 
Male 98.40 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Female 97.69 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Educational transition from primary school to middle school (in percentage) 
Male 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Female 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Educational transition from middle school to college and above (in percentage) 
Male 12.63 25.00 25.00 25.00 
Female 11.34 25.00 25.00 25.00 
Migration (in millions) 
Total 6.31 30.81 30.81 30.81 
No schooling 0.67 3.25 3.25 3.25 
Primary school 1.34 6.55 6.55 6.55 
Middle school 3.61 17.62 17.62 17.62 
College and above 0.69 3.39 3.39 3.39 
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Table 13  Base Year Parameters and High Scenario Assumptions  
for Urban China in 2045 
 
 Base year 1995 Scenario H1 Scenario H2 Scenario H3 
TFR     
Total population 1.48 1.75 1.75 2.29 
No schooling 2.32 2.72 1.75 2.29 
Primary school 1.92 2.38 1.75 2.29 
Middle school  1.42 1.75 1.75 2.29 
College and above 1.21 1.65 1.75 2.29 
Life expectancy (in years)    
Male 71.17 76.10 76.10 76.10 
Female 76.15 81.10 81.10 81.10 
Educational transition from no schooling to primary school (in percentage) 
Male 98.40 98.40 98.40 98.40 
Female 97.69 97.69 97.69 97.69 
Educational transition from primary school to middle school (in percentage) 
Male 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Female 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Educational transition from middle school to college and above (in percentage) 
Male 12.63 12.63 12.63 12.63 
Female 11.34 11.34 11.34 11.34 
Migration (in millions) 
Total 6.31 50.18 50.18 50.18 
No schooling 0.67 5.30 5.30 5.30 
Primary school 1.34 10.66 10.66 10.66 
Middle school 3.61 28.70 28.70 28.70 
College and above 0.69 5.52 5.52 5.52 
!
Table 14a  TFR Under Low, Central, and High Scenarios for  
All China in 2045 
 
Scenarios Low fertility Central fertility High fertility 
Assumptions    
No convergence 1.56 1.75 2.32 
Education converged 1.50 1.86 2.12 
Education and region 
converged 
1.50 1.82 2.29 
 
Table 14b  Estimated TFR by Education in 1995 for All China 
 
 Total No schooling Primary school Middle school College and above 
TFR 1.85 2.32 1.98 1.68 1.21 
 
Calculations are based on Office of Population Survey (1997) 
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Section 4  Analyses of the Projection Results 
 
 
 
ables 15-21 show the main results of the multi-state projection for China up to 
2045. There are nine sets of projections, in which three scenarios (low, central, and 
high assumptions for fertility, mortality, migration, and education) are combined with 
no convergence, education converged, and education and region converged. In addition 
to the nine sets, the constant migration scenario is used to more clearly define the 
differentials by education in future population development. 
 
 
4.1 Population Size 
 
Based on a total population of 1.2 billion in 1995, Table 15 indicates that the Chinese 
population will certainly increase. According to the low, central, and high scenarios, the 
Chinese population for 2045 will be 1.37-1.38 billion (low), 1.48-1.49 billion (central), 
and 1.55-1.59 billion (high). Even under the extreme scenario of low fertility, the 
population is expected to grow by about 143-173 million. 
 
Although the population will continue to increase over the next five decades, it will 
grow at different speeds in different years and in rural and urban regions. In the low 
scenario, population growth reaches its peak during 2020-2025. In the central scenario, 
it peaks between 2030-2035, after which the population begins to show negative 
growth. In the high scenario, growth will peak in 2045. The population in both rural and 
urban regions will increase particularly rapidly during the next 20 to 35 years. Due to 
the age structure of the population in the base year, the number of women of 
reproductive age (15-49) will increase until between 2010 to 2015. The total number of 
reproductive women will be around 300-350 million, according to the central and high 
assumptions. The period from 1995 to 2015 is a crucial time for China’s future 
population growth. However, the speed of population growth is different between rural 
and urban China, since migration is an active factor in the projection. More migrants 
entering the cities bring a higher increase in urban population size, as shown by all 
scenarios. If we keep migration constant, as in C1 and H1 of Table 15, in central and 
high scenarios combined with no educational and regional convergence, the increased 
rate of urban population size is lower than 13.94% for the central scenario, and 29.58% 
for the high scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T 
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Table 15  Population Size (in Millions) Under Low, Central, and High 
Scenarios in 2045 
 
   Low Scenario Central Scenario High Scenario 
  Base year Population Rate of Population Rate of Population Rate of 
  population  increase  increase  increase 
  1995  (%)  (%)  (%) 
No Rural 860.36 919.83 6.91 977.01 13.56 990.51 15.13 
Convergence Urban 344.22 457.38 32.88 505.02 46.72 577.12 67.66 
 China 1204.57 1377.21 14.33 1482.03 23.03 1567.63 30.14 
     C1: constant migration H1: constant migration 
 Rural 860.36   1024.62 19.09 1091.98 26.92 
 Urban 344.22   457.09 32.79 475.31 38.08 
 China 1204.57   1481.71 23.01 1567.29 30.11 
Education Rural 860.36 916.70 6.55 970.58 12.81 969.42 12.68 
Converged Urban 344.22 456.52 32.63 506.13 47.04 576.32 67.43 
 China 1204.57 1373.23 14.00 1476.71 22.59 1545.74 28.32 
Education Rural 860.36 874.39 1.63 952.72 10.74 969.41 12.68 
and region Urban 344.22 472.69 37.32 539.14 56.63 620.91 80.38 
Converged China 1204.57 1347.08 11.83 1491.86 23.85 1590.32 32.02 
 
 
4.2 Age Structure 
 
Tables 16 and 17 present the age structure under the multi-state projection. By 2045 the 
proportion of the 0-14 age group in the total population will decline to about 14%-
14.8% in the low scenario, more than 16% in the central scenario, and about 19%-20% 
in the high assumption, compared to 26.73% in total population in 1995. Meanwhile, 
the proportion of the age group 60 and over in the total population will increase from 
10.17% in 1995 to about 31% in the low scenario, about 29% in the central scenario, 
and about 26% in the high scenario. This means that the proportion aged 60 and over 
will double or even triple in size over the next decades. This will be a period of very 
rapid aging, as a result of the baby boomers (born between the mid-1960s and early 
1970s) reaching their advanced years. As a result, there will be no growth in the 
working-age population after 2025 in the low scenario, and between 2030-2035 in the 
central scenario. Thereafter follows a decline in the working age population. 
 
The results of the projection show differences in the aging process in rural and urban 
regions. When considering the level and speed of aging, either the proportion of elderly 
or the speed of aging in urban areas is higher than in rural areas in all scenarios, while 
according to the data of the base year, the proportion aged 60 and over was almost at the 
same level in rural and urban regions. However, if we compare the no convergence 
scenario with the education and region converged scenario, in which a convergence of 
fertility around the middle school level across the different educational categories and in 
rural/urban regions takes place, the increase in aging in urban regions will be slightly 
slower, and the proportion of elderly will decrease more than 2%. The difference 
between rural and urban areas becomes smaller under the education and region 
converged scenario. 
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Table 16  Population (in Millions), and Proportion of 0-14 Age Group in 
the Total Population in 2045 (in %) 
 
  Base Year 1995 Low Scenario Central Scenario High Scenario 
  Population Total Population Total Population Total Population Total 
No Rural 247.12 28.72 154.06 16.75 181.24 18.55 224.95 22.71 
Convergence Urban 74.91 21.76 49.89 10.91 57.65 11.42 79.04 13.70 
 China 322.03 26.73 203.95 14.81 238.89 16.12 303.99 19.39 
      C1: constant migration H1: constant migration 
 Rural     185.99 18.15 236.90 21.69 
 Urban     53.81 11.77 69.42 14.61 
 China     239.80 16.18 306.32 19.54 
Education Rural 247.12 28.72 153.10 16.70 178.23 18.36 213.39 22.01 
Converged Urban 74.91 21.76 49.61 10.87 58.48 11.55 78.68 13.65 
 China 322.03 26.73 202.71 14.76 236.71 16.03 292.07 18.90 
Education Rural 247.12 28.72 130.31 14.90 167.66 17.60 213.39 22.01 
And region Urban 74.91 21.76 58.56 12.39 77.67 14.41 106.42 17.14 
Converged China 322.03 26.73 188.87 14.02 245.33 16.44 319.81 20.11 
 
 
 
Table 17  Population (in Millions), and Proportion of Ages 60 and Over in 
the Total Population in 2045 (in %) 
 
  Base year 1995 Low Scenario Central Scenario High Scenario 
  Population Total Population Total Population Total Population Total 
No Rural 85.97 9.99 265.12 28.82 263.44 26.96 242.29 24.46 
Convergence Urban 36.49 10.60 160.54 35.10 163.10 32.30 164.13 28.44 
 China 122.47 10.17 425.66 30.91 426.54 28.78 406.42 25.93 
      C1: constant migration H1: constant migration 
 Rural     272.13 26.56 260.07 23.82 
 Urban     153.60 33.60 145.42 30.59 
 China     425.73 28.73 405.48 25.87 
Education Rural 85.97 9.99 265.12 28.92 263.42 27.14 242.51 25.02 
Converged Urban 36.49 10.60 160.54 35.16 163.10 32.22 164.13 28.48 
 China 122.47 10.17 425.66 31.00 426.52 28.88 406.64 26.31 
Education Rural 85.97 9.99 265.12 30.32 263.62 27.67 242.52 25.02 
And region Urban 36.49 10.60 160.54 33.96 163.10 30.25 164.13 26.43 
Converged China 122.47 10.17 425.66 31.60 426.72 28.60 406.65 25.57 
!
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4.3 Educational Composition 
 
Tables 18-20 provide a picture of the total population of China by educational level in 
the end year of projection. The results for all scenarios show a rapid decline in the 
percentage of the population with no schooling in rural and urban areas. In rural regions, 
the proportion with no schooling decreases from 27.17% in 1995 to 8%-13% until 2045 
in all scenarios. This change implies that China can substantially reduce the illiterate or 
semi-literate population. For China as whole, the total population with no schooling will 
decrease from 18.36% in the base year to between 7.5% and 11.5% in 2045. 
 
Another important result from the multi-state projection is that the middle school level 
will increase considerably over the next decades. In all scenarios, by 2045, the 
percentage of urban area population attending middle schools is between 68%-71%, i.e., 
about 17%-21% higher than in the base year. As a result, in all of China, the total 
population attaining a middle school education will reach 55%-66% by 2045, while it 
was only 41.06% in the base year. 
 
It is interesting to note that in the low to high scenarios, the size of both the rural and the 
urban population under the education converged scenario is smaller than under the no 
convergence scenario, although the assumptions for total fertility in these two scenarios 
are almost same (except H3=2.29 is slightly higher than H1=2.38 in rural regions). Even 
in the assumption on TFR for urban China, C2 is higher than C1, but the size of the 
population is still smaller. This situation is evident when we consider fertility 
differentials by educational level. In the education converged scenario, we assume 
fertility converging to the middle school level across educational categories, which are 
1.7, 1.91, 2.29 for rural, and 1.29, 1.42, 1.75 for urban China. The differentials of 
fertility by education disappear. The size of the population under the education 
converged scenario points out that slow growth is associated with a general increase in 
the level of education. 
 
 
Table 18  Population Distribution (in %) by Education Under Low, 
Central, and High Scenarios in Rural China in 2045 
 
  Base year 1995 Low Scenario Central Scenario High Scenario 
No no schooling 27.17 8.80 9.81 13.42 
Convergence primary school 42.72 33.28 25.64 39.44 
 middle school 29.87 56.53 64.00 47.09 
 college and above 0.25 1.39 0.55 0.05 
    C1: constant migration H1: constant migration 
 no schooling   9.81 12.93 
 primary school   25.48 38.44 
 middle school   64.07 48.40 
 college and above   0.64 0.23 
Education no schooling 27.17 8.78 9.74 12.76 
converged primary school 42.72 33.31 25.63 28.64 
 middle school 29.87 56.53 64.06 58.51 
 college and above 0.25 1.38 0.57 0.09 
Education no schooling 27.17 8.05 9.45 12.76 
and region primary school 42.72 33.70 25.49 28.64 
converged middle school 29.87 56.91 64.59 58.51 
 college and above 0.25 1.34 0.47 0.09 
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Table 19  Population Distribution (in %) by Education Under Low, 
Central, and High Scenarios in Urban China in 2045 
 
  Base year 1995 Low Scenario Central Scenario High Scenario 
No no schooling 15.93 5.85 6.33 7.56 
convergence primary school 26.97 11.22 11.81 12.73 
 middle school 50.50 70.60 69.84 70.03 
 college and above 6.61 12.33 12.02 9.68 
    C1: constant migration H1: constant migration 
 no schooling   6.17 7.93 
 primary school   11.29 11.84 
 middle school   70.28 70.19 
 college and above   12.26 10.04 
Education no schooling 15.90 5.84 6.40 7.55 
converged primary school 26.97 11.21 11.85 12.72 
 middle school 50.50 70.62 69.75 70.04 
 college and above 6.61 12.33 12.00 9.69 
Education no schooling 15.93 6.51 7.72 9.29 
and region primary school 26.97 11.62 12.61 13.62 
converged middle school 50.50 69.68 68.04 67.87 
 college and above 6.61 12.19 11.63 9.23 
 
 
 
Table 20  Population Distribution (in %) by Education Under Low, 
Central, and High Scenarios for All of China in 2045 
 
  Base year 1995 Low Scenario Central Scenario High Scenario 
No no schooling 18.36 7.82 8.66 11.11 
convergence primary school 37.96 25.95 21.06 30.17 
 middle school 41.06 61.21 65.94 55.29 
 college and above 2.62 5.02 4.35 3.44 
    C1: constant migration H1: constant migration 
 no schooling   8.69 11.27 
 primary school   21.10 30.37 
 middle school   65.90 55.22 
 college and above   4.31 3.14 
Education no schooling 18.36 7.81 8.63 10.90 
converged primary school 37.96 25.96 21.04 22.96 
 middle school 41.06 61.20 65.96 62.63 
 college and above 2.62 5.03 4.37 3.51 
Education no schooling 18.36 7.51 8.84 11.46 
and region primary school 37.96 25.95 20.96 23.01 
converged middle school 41.06 61.39 65.80 62.02 
 college and above 2.62 5.15 4.40 3.51 
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4.4 Rural-Urban Distribution 
 
Table 21 presents the rural and urban population distribution in 2045, resulting from our 
projection. By 2045, the proportion of total urban population will reach different levels 
based on the different scenarios. When we look across all scenarios, we see two things: 
1) An increase in the proportion of the urban population is largely caused by the 
number of rural-to-urban migrants. The scenario is combined with greater migration 
to show a higher proportion of urban population. For example, in the high scenario, 
the urban proportion reaches 39%, while the low scenario shows 35%. 
 
2) The proportion of the total urban population is influenced by fertility differentials at 
the educational and regional levels. In scenarios combined with education and region 
converged, in which a convergence of fertility across educational categories and in 
rural/urban regions takes place, and fertility differentials by education and 
rural/urban disappear, the proportion of the urban population is higher. 
 
As mentioned previously, migration analysis is arguably the most complex demographic 
variable for our population projection. In projecting the proportion of urban population 
over the next decades, three important dimensions should be taken into account. 
 
1) The methodological measurement in the classification of rural-to-urban migration. 
Our assumption for migration lies in the definition of a migrant: one who has left a 
rural region of registered residence, and has lived or worked continuously for more 
than one-half year in a city or town without permanent residency rights for that city 
or town, but has been registered as a temporary resident. The short-term “floating” 
population is excluded. The base year data on migration is relatively small. 
Therefore, we believe that the proportion of total urban population over the next 
decades will be higher than our assumption concludes, since a large rural migratory 
movement outside of the planned migration track will play a substantial role in the 
urban economy and in the urbanization process. 
 
2) To what degree will the central government relax the urban household registration 
system, and to what extent will the government keep the policy of avoiding excessive 
population concentrations in cities in the near future? The World Bank (1995) has 
estimated that by 2050, the government policy of avoiding excessive population 
concentrations in cities will keep the share of urban employment in China at around 
50% of the total labor force. This is significantly below the 70%-80% reached in 
countries such as Japan and Korea. 
 
3) How many rural-urban migrants, including the floating population, will be absorbed 
as permanent residents in cities during the economic development? The rural-to-
urban migratory movement to big cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou, 
has shown that there is a need to coordinate the growth of the regional economy and 
the constraint of migratory cost under market-economic conditions. On the one hand, 
large cities begin to absorb selected rural-to-urban migrants as their permanent 
inhabitants. On the other, most floating population do not settle down in cities, but 
rather continue their urbanization process after returning to their original residence. 
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Table 21  Total Urban Population (in %) in Total Population in 2045 
!
 Base year 1995 Low Scenario Central Scenario High Scenario 
No convergence 28.58 33.21 34.08 36.81 
   C1: constant migration H1: constant migration 
   31.00 30.00 
Education converged 28.58 33.24 34.27 37.29 
Education and region 
converged 
28.58 35.09 36.14 39.04 
!
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Section 5 Conclusion: Population and Sustainable 
      Development in the Context of Policy, 
      Education, and Economy in China 
 
 
hina’s population trends have challenged the ability of the government and the land 
to provide sufficient food and housing. The ongoing population change has affected 
prospects for sustainable socioeconomic and environmental development. Over the next 
decades, the following trends pertaining to the sustainable development of population, 
economy and environment might be assumed: 1) An ever increasing population will 
result in three peaks: total population, aging, and working-age population. 2) An ever 
decreasing consummation of resources per capita, especially land, will result from a 
large population (Yuan et al. 1997). 3) The economy will take off with a dramatic 
reform of the economic structure. The GDP and GDP per capita will increase smoothly 
with a stable economic structure, a slow reduction in agriculture, and a steady increase 
in third industry. 4) The degradation of natural ecosystems will continue. The coming 
century will support the largest number of people with the most destroyed ecosystems 
(Yuan et al. 1997). All of these trends may seriously restrain China’s prospects for 
sustainable development. 
 
When considering future population and sustainable development, Chinese scholars and 
policy makers are faced with numerous questions: 1) Will the current low fertility level 
be sustained, or will there be a rebound? 2) How can low fertility levels be stabilized 
after fertility has reached below or near replacement level? 3) When will the 
government adjust the current population policy? 4) What are the implications of very 
low fertility for the economy and society? 5) How should the anticipated socioeconomic 
development in coming decades be figured into the demographic trade-off between 
rapid fertility decline in the near term, and rapid population aging in the long term? In 
the context of global sustainable development, population is usually seen as an 
important independent force, since the number of people strongly affects the demand for 
food, shelter, health and infrastructure. Moreover, any sudden relaxation of the 
population policy, in a country with many poor and backward rural areas, without 
adequate preparation could result in a new baby boom (Zeng 1996). Therefore, China 
should select a way of smoothly stabilizing the population as well as a policy for long-
term population trends. 
 
Education will be an essential part of population and sustainable development planning 
in the coming decades. It is not only the Chinese experience that fertility decline has 
been interacting with education. This can clearly be seen in the results of multi-state 
projections. A slow-growing population is associated with an increase in educational 
attainment. Education differentials will affect the age structure as well as the rural/urban 
distribution of population over the next five decades. 
 
Fertility changes in China have frequently been categorized as “induced” and “natural.” 
The rural fertility transition has been considered an induced decline and the urban 
fertility transition a natural decline. A strategic policy shifting should lead to a 
narrowing of the gap between the government’s goals to limit the fast growing 
C 
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population and the peasantry’s demand for more children in the near future. The 
mandatory education program in rural China could lower fertility. This calls for a 
successful switch of focus of the Chinese family planning programs from executive 
methods to an “integrated approach” which involves enhancement of education, better 
status for women, and social welfare. 
 
A rapid increase in aging and fast growing rural-to-urban migration will co-exist in 
China in the future. The results of the multi-state projection show that an increase in the 
proportion of urban population is largely caused by the extent of rural-to-urban 
migration. Both the proportion of elderly and the speed of aging in urban areas is higher 
than in rural areas. Thus, from the perspective of securing a more favorable ratio of 
working-age persons to retirement-age persons, more rural-to-urban migration might 
contribute to a smoother change in the population age structure in the cities. 
 
According to the results of our projection, the future educational composition of the 
population will increase considerably in the middle school level over the next decades. 
This will be a significant benefit to sustainable population, socioeconomic, and 
environmental development. The changing of the educational composition of the 
population will coincide with the changing of the economic structure, with a slow 
reduction in agriculture and a steady increase in the service sector. In this sense, the 
combination of education and population projections significantly contributes to 
understanding sustainable development options for China. 
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